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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
TRANS-MISSISSIPPI MIASMAS: HOW MALARIA & YELLOW
FEVER SHAPED THE COURSE OF THE
CIVIL WAR IN THE CONFEDERACY'S WESTERN THEATER
By Andrew McIhvaine Bell
3
By the autumn of 1862, Sabine City was arguably the most important
Confederate seaport in Texas. Situated on a peninsula in the easternmost part
of the state that separates Sabine Lake and a river of the same name from the
Gulf of Mexico, the town had been transfonned by the Civil War from a sleepy
frontier entrcpot with one hotel, newspaper, and sawmill into a magnet for
bands of smugglers and speculators who ran cotton, weapons, and other sup-
plies between the Confederacy and the Caribbean. The U.S. Navy had only
recently begun blockading the Texas coast and had most of its ships patrolling
the waters around Galveston, the state's biggest port city at the time. Sabine,
with its close proximity to the Gulf and a railroad line that ran into the Texas
interior, became the next best option for blockade runners anxious to avoid
entanglements with Union gunboats. Admiral David Farragut, the genius
behind the North's capture of New Orleans, realized that his fleet could not
stop the illicit trade without controlling the cities that offered smugglers safe
harbor. When he encouraged his commanders to take initiative and seize these
port cities wherever possible, forty-one-year-old Frederick W. Crocker, a for-
mer whaler from Massachusetts who had sailed around the world beforc he
joined the Navy, decided to attack Sabine City. I
At the fort protecting the city, Confederate Major Josephus Irvine had a
battle on his hands even before Crocker's boats showed up. The previous July,
a British blockade runner had arrived at the city's docks from the Gulf and dis-
gorged along with its smuggled cargo the virus which causes yellow fever, one
of the most feared diseases of the nineteenth century. By September, a full-
blown epidemic was undenvay in Sabine with between three and six new
cases appearing 'every 24 hours.' Panicked residents and soldiers alike evac-
uated the town. Those who fled to Houston and Beaumont were quarantined
on the outskirts of both cities as Confederate authorities fretted about the pos-
sibility that the outbreak might spread. Mrs. Otis McGaffey lived in Sabine at
the time and in later years recalled how her family's suffering was com-
pounded by the egregious incompetence of local doctors: "[They] seemed to
know littlc if anything about trealing the patients, some getting drunk, and use-
less (as they were afraid of it) [;] others not knowing what to do." The
McGaffeys flcd to nearby Weiss' Bluff, but were turned away by neighbors
who were afraid of contracting the disease. The Confederate force guarding
Sabine dropped from about 1,800 troops to fewer than eighty. By the last week
of September, Crocker's squadron, consisting of three vessels-the
Kensington, the Rachel Seaman, and the Henry Janes·--arrived and opened
fire on the fort. Irvine, realizing his position was untenable, ordered the guns
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spiked and withdrew his forces by eight o'clock on the morning of September
25, 1862.~
Crocker soon realized his enemies had retreated and went ashore to raise
the Stars and Stripes over Fort Sabine. Onc of his subordinates, Lewis
Pennington, who commanded the Hemy Janes and had once lived in Sabine,
entered the city and learned from the few dozen residents left that yellow fever
had killed "nearly one-half of the population" (including the town's mayor)
and that the disease had forced several hundred rebel troops to withdraw to
nearby Beaumont. Pennington and Crocker were shocked to find the dreaded
"scourge of the South" raging in Sabine and kept their men "close to their
hoats" as much as possible during the brief occupation, only sending them
ashore to perfonn necessary tasks like capturing a family of Confederate spies
and burning the town's railroad depot. Thirty mil es away in Beaumont, the
Confederates in Elmore's Twentieth Texas Regiment, who had been sent as
reinforcements to drive the Yankees out of Sabine. were terrified at the
prospect of entering an area plagued by yellow fever. The lieutenant-colonel
in charge of the regiment raised such a ruckus about the danger of the disease
that he was ordered not to mention the phrase "yenow fever" in the presence
of his superior officer. With no one to challenge their landing at Sabine, the
federals moved into Taylor's Bayou, tcn miles away, and fired a railroad
bridge, which was saved temporarily by an alert Confederate private who
doused the flames, though Union troops later returned to destroy it. Crocker's
forces continued to operate with impunity for another month, capturing pris-
oners and burning blockade runners, before rumors of a massive Confederate
attack unnerved Union commanders who resumed their blockading duties and
allowed the forts along the Texas coast to fall back under Southern control..1
Crocker's bloodless conquest of Sabine was made possible by the swarms
of Aedes aeg;.pti mosquitoes that inhabited the city. Unbeknownst to
Antebellum physicians, yellow fever was being transmitted from person to
person by these insects, which lay their eggs in hollow logs and artificial
receptacles containing fresh water. Filthy Southern cities offered nearly limit-
less incubation pools for Aedes aeKypti eggs in the fonn of horse troughs, bar-
rels. clogged gutters, and trash in the streets filled with rainwater. Winter frosts
limited the activity of the mosquito and prevented yellow fever from ever
becoming endemic in North America, but the virus was continually reintro-
duced by cargo ships arriving from the Caribbean where it existed year-round.
A single infected sailor or mosquito on board could spread yellow fever to the
local Aedes aeglrpfi population and cause widespread misery and death!
The disease created a level of physical and emotional suffering that can
scarcely be imagined today. Victims in the advanced stages of an infection
bled from the nose and mouth, suffered excruciating headaches, fever, jaun-
dice and, worst of all, vomited a substance resembling coffee grounds (half-
digested blood) caused by internal hemorrhaging, which was a tell-tale sign of
the virus. Case fatality rates during epidemics ranged from fifteen to over fifty
percent, but those who survived acquired lifetime immunity. Nineteenth-cen-
tury Americans lived in fear of the disease they called the "scourge of the
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South" and public panics often followed the first sign of an outbreak.5
But thi& scourge was not the only mosquito-home disease that threatened
the heaHh of soldiers and civilians living in the Confederate west. Malaria, a
parasite transmitted by the anopheles mosquito, was a far more common ail-
ment in the region. Symptoms of the disease included chills, shakes, nausea,
headache, an enlarged &pleen, and a fever that spikes every one to three days
depending on the type of malaria and its parasitic cycle. Of the four types of
malaria that infect human beings -plasmodium malariae, plasmodium ovale,
plasmodium viva"t, and plasmodium .!iJlciparum-only the latter two strains
were once major prohlems in the United States. P viva.x rarely proved fatal to
its victims. hut I). falciparum W3S often deadly.1i
Nineteenth-century physicians categorized malaria according to how
otten fever spikes or "paroxysms" occurred. A "quotidian" fever appeared
once every twenty-four hours, a "tertian" every forty-eight, and a "quartan"
every seventy-two. Plasmodium vivax was commonly referred to as "intelmit-
tent fever," "ague," "dumb ague," or "chill-fever," while plasmodium falci-
parum was known as "congestive fever," "malignant fever,'" or "pernicious
malaria" because of its lethal effect."
Physicians differed over what caused malaria for most of the nineteenth
century. Endless theories circulated in medical journals or were discussed at
conventions at a time when medicine was more ali than science. Some practi-
tioners, perhaps a majority, believed decomposing animals and plants pro-
duced the noxious "miasmas" that poisoned the air and sickened their patients;
others thought electrical charges in the ozone caused the dreaded malady. Still
others rejected the "bad air" theory all together and instead blamed excess
hydro-carbons in the blood. No one suspected that the tiny insects whose
omnipresence seemed perfectly natural and non-threatening were responsible
for the fevers that mysteriously appeared during the warmer months.'
As settlers cleared virgin forests to make way for the cotton famls that
drove the antebellum southern economy, they inadvertently created a plethora
of new breeding sites [or anopheles. At a time when mosquito control meas-
ures such as DDT-spraying were still unknown, clouds of insects swarmed
wagon trains and slave conks, sparking complaints about "fever" and "ague"
in the collon states where cmde hOLlsing, poor drainage, and frequent flooding
increased the frequency of the disease. \\-'hen men from all over the counny
assembled in these same states to settle the issues of federalism and slavery on
the battlctield. large numbers of new prey for mosquitoes suddenly appeared. 9
The first hattIe of Sabine Pass (as it would later be called) reveals the
health hazards that were faced by Union and Confederate forces operating in
the trans-Mississippi theater and how mosquitoes periodically played a role in
the outcome of military operations in the region. The two states where these
insects were the most troublesome, Arkansas and Texas, were both in the
Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi Department. Arkansas held the ignoble dis-
tinction of being the Union army's most malarious department from 1863 to
1865 while Texas experienced more ycllow fever epidemics during the war
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than any other state in the Confederacy. Thousand~ of soldiers stationed in the
region shook violently \vlth "ague~' or spewed black vomit before drawing
their last breath.
The Sabine yellow fever epidemic was just one of a spate of outbreaks in
1862 that alarmed Union commanders and helped dissuade the North from
establishing pennanent occupation points along the Texas coastlinc. "Yellow
jack" hit Brownsville, Matagorda, and Indianola in the same year and was
rumored to be raging in Houston, Galveston, and at the mouth of the Rio
Grande. The disease also threatened Confederate garrisons stationed near the
Gulf coast, as the Sabine example shows,!O
When Admiral David Farragut learned in the fall of 1862 [hat
Confederates were trading "hundreds of bales" of cotton through Matamoros,
Mexico, he wanted to seize Fort Brown and establish a Union troop presence
in the area as quickly as possible. But his concerns about what yellow fcver
might do to an occupation force and Butler's unwillingness to provide troops
for the expedition kept Brownsville in Confederate hands for another year.
One of Farragut's subordinates, Henry French, who had command of the
US.S. Albatross, \vas so worried by the cases of yellow fever that showed up
onboard his vessel while it was off the coast of Texas that he ordered the ship
back to the navy yard at Pensacola. Farragut was incensed at French's unau-
thorized retreat. "'You were sent to blockade the Rio Grande, and you had no
right to leave that station until regularly relieved by some other vessel," railed
the admiral, who made it clear that for the Navy at least, the importance of the
mission trumped all other concerns: "Our duties in war arc imperative, and we
arc as much bound to face the fever as the enemy, and to face both when nec-
essary in our duty." An unlucky ship, the Albatross was again plagued \\'ith
yellow fever the followlng year. II
French and Crocker were not the only Union naval officers operating otf
the Texas coast in 1862 who were worried about yellow fever. Brooklyn-
native William Renshaw received instructions in September 10 move his mor-
tar flotilla "down the coast of Texas" in order to intercept blockade runners
and, if possible, capture Galveston. Rensha\v, inspired by Farragut's audacious
seizure of New Orleans, ordered his fleet into Galveston Bay and demanded
"the unconditlonal surrender of the city" after a brief exchange of fire with
Confederate shore batteries. Renshaw's tough tenns softened, however, when
he learned from two clever southern negotiators that yellow fever was raging
in Galveston (in reality, there was no epidemic in the clty at the time.) Not
wishing to expose un-acclimated Union troops to the disease, he agreed to a
four-hour truce so that civilians could evacuate the city as long as
Confederates did not bolster their defenses. Confederate Colonel Joseph J.
Cook took advantage of a loophole in the terms-there was never an explicit
prohibition to the withdrawal of forces- to save several guns from capture by
moving them to the mainland. Cook's apparent breach of faith outraged
Renshaw and he considered launching an attack in retaliation, but after con-
sidering the diplomatic implications of potcntially killing foreign nationals in
the city, the strength ofConfederate forces, and ··the great danger of contagion
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from yellow [ever," he allowed Cook to proceed without incident. Renshaw
believed "two old-fashioned 24-pounders, one 80-pounder rifle, and another
gun" were not worth the price of exposing his sailors to a "fatal disease" that
promised to kill ';many innocent people." When the city surrendered a short
time later, he was content to lead a small force to raise the Stars and Stripes
over the customhouse for thirty minutes and then retreat to the safety of his
ship while his troops stayed close to Galveston's wharves. General John B.
Magruder used the guns and men Cook saved-in large part thanks to
Renshaw's fears of yellow fever- to recapture Galveston for the Confederacy
the following January were. l "
As these examples show, yellow fever raged all along the Texas coa~t dur-
ing the autumn of 1862. From Sabine to Brownsville, Aedes aegypti mosqui-
toes helped create a military stalemate in the Lone Star State that ultimately
worked to the South's advantage. Although the U.S. Navy outgunned the
Confederacy's shore defenses, the task of occupying the major trade hubs
along six hundred miles of coastline proved impossible for the North during
the sickly season, both because troops were needed elsewhere and because
sending un-acclimated northern military personnel into areas known to be
plagued with yellmv fever was an unwise and potentially dangerous strategy.
Farragut, Crocker, French, and Renshaw were all unnerved at some point by
the prospect of exposing their men to "yellow jack," and either withdrew their
forces or altered their plans in the region.
As Aedes aeKypti scuttled Union Naval operations in Texas, anopheles
mosquitoes attacked U.S. soldiers stationed further north, creating medical
complications for men already suffering from a battery of other diseases.
While stationed in Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma), the Tenth Kansas
Volunteers was stricken with "malarious fever," diarrhea, and scurvy. The
Tenth's surgeon was able to obtain a "supply of desiccated vegetables," which
supposedly helped eradicate the latter ailment. During the first autumn of the
war, the Second \t1issouri Infantry spent time in the mos.quito-infested country
between Springfield and S1. Louis and was plagued with "quotidian and tert-
ian inte111littents," (malaria) dysentery, and diarrhea. The Second had not been
issued tents and soldiers slept out in the open with only blankets, making them
easy targets for anopheles. In June of 1862, dysentery and diarrhea plagued
their comrades in the Third Missouri Cavalry (who were stationed in the same
area) and by August, the number of cases of malaria was on the rise. But sol-
diers sent to Arkansas suffered the most from the disease."
After the re-opening of the Mississippi River in the summer of 1863,
Union commanders were anxious to keep pressure on the remaining
Confederate armies in the field and seize as much territory as possible. Tn
Arkansas, it was necessary for U.S. forces to control the Arkansas River in
order to protect the northern part of the state and Missouri from rebel attacks.
With these goals in mind, Grant ordered Major General Frederick Steele to
march an army of 12,000 bluecoats across Arkansas to destroy General
Sterling Price's Confederate force and capture the state capital at Little Rock.
Steele's Army of Arkansas consisted of regiments that had been stationed at
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Helena all summer -a city one Cnion soldier remembered as a "malaria-
stricken, disease-fostering holc"-and units transferred from Mississippi after
the fall of Vicksburg. Large numbers of men in both groups were already
infected with plasmodium parasites when they rendezvoused in Helena at the
end of July. Two brigades from Kimball's Division (Sixteenth Corps) arrived
from Snyder's Bluff "suffering severely from the malarious influences of the
Yazoo country." The Third Minnesota had contracted malaria in the area while
felling trcc~, digging rifle pits, and performing picket duty. A number of other
units sent to Steele had spent time along the Big Black River, an area the U.S.
Sanitary Commission had found to be rife with disease. The parasites these
men contracted in Mississippi were introduced into an environment that was
already plagued with endemic malaria. "Swamps" and "bayous" that were
"covered with green scum in dry weather," dominated the countryside sur-
rounding Helena, conditions that allowed mosquitoes to thrive. Malaria was so
common in Helena that one soldier thought that the "chief occupation" of the
city's residents was "damning the Union every day and shaking with ague
every other day."14
The anopheles population of Arkansas quickly spread various strains of
malaria among the mcn in Steele's command and helped make thelr march to
Little Rock a nightmarish ordeal. Scores ofmen fell out of the ranks in exhaus-
tion while others cast off blankets, clothing, and knapsacks to lighten the load,
creating a trail of discarded items along the marching route. By the time Steele
arrived in Clarendon, where John W. Davidson and 6,000 Union cavalrymen
reinforced his troops~ malaria was epidemic in his anny. Andrew Sperry was a
soldier with the Thirty-third Iowa who in later years described Clarendon as
the "home and head-quarters of ague in bulk and quantity." He and his fellow
Iowans, who had grown up in a malarious state, believed the Arkansas varlety
of the disease was especially severe. One morning during their stay at
Clarendon, the bugler responsible for blowing the Thirty-third to sick call was
shaking so severely from a malaria-induced chill that he could not perfonn his
duties. \Vhen two other men, includlng a lieutenant colonel, attempted to fill
in for the ailing soldier, they too were seized with malarial shakes, leading
Sperry to conclude that there "was aguc in the bugle. "15
By the time the army reached De Valls Bluff at the end of August, Steele
took notice of the disease problem. "The sick list is frightful, including many
officers," he reported to General Stephen Hurlbut on the nventy-thlrd. "More
than 1,000 here present are reported unfit for duty, and about one-half of the
command proper are absent." On September I, he identified the cause of his
troops' suffering: '''Many of our men have been taken down with fevers, and
chills and fever, lately."16
Malaria afflicted Steele's army for a number of reasons. First, it marched
through the "'swamps and marshes" of Arkansas at a time of year when mos-
quitoefoi were highly active. Nineteen thousand men and an untold number of
animals clustered together provided an irresistible target for hungry anopheles.
Many of these men had spent the summer in the Mississlppi, Yazoo, or Big
Black River basins and already carried plasmodium parasites before the cam-
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paign began. Second, the Army of Arkansas was poorly provisioned. Many of
the soldiers had not been issued tents and were forced to sleep in the open,
making it easy for mosquitoes to feed on their bodies. Quinine, the one medi-
cine that could effectively control the symptoms ofmalaria, was administered
only irregularly because of army supply problems and the unusually high
demand for the drug in the department. Steele set up temporary hospitals at
Clarendon, Dc Valls Bluff, Brownsville, and eventually Little Rock, which
stretched his supply of medicines to the breaking point. Requests for addi-
tional drug supplies had to be sent to Memphis, which created "long and vex-
atious delays." Finally, Steele's medical staff was in disarray during much of
the campaign. There was a shortage of doctors-several regimental medical
officers were inexplicably absent during the campaign-and at least some of
those on duty were "manifestly unfit for their place." Shoddy treatment of the
sick prompted Steele to take action on August the twenty-fourth while the
amlY was camped at De Valls Bluff. He ordered his regimental commanders
to find out who was to blame for the "gross neglect" of ill troops. Eventually,
a group of regimental surgeons brought charges of "incompetency and neglect
of duty" agalnst I.C. Whitehill, Assistant Medical Director of the Anny but
Steele, pressed by Confederate cavalry raids and worried about Confederate
General Sterling Price's next move, dropped the matter. p
Dysentery and the suffocating summertime humidity of Arkansas
wreaked further havoc on the health of Steele's men. Lacking a steady supply
of fresh water, thirsty soldiers dipped their canteens in stagnant bogs and pud-
dles where hogs had wallowed. By the first week of September, the anny was
at Brmvllsville where it again was "encumbered with a large number of sick-
near 700." Steele had no choice but to detach two brigades ofcavalry to guard
the ailing troops and keep his supply lines open. Des.pite such setbacks, the
general drove the remainder of his anny across thc Arkansas River and into
Little Rock. Outgunned, outflanked, and anxious to avoid John Pemberton's
fate, Price hastily withdrew his forces sixty miles southwest to Arkadelphia.
Steele's exhausted cavalrymen only gave brief chase before retiring. fn the
end, only 136 men in the Army ofArkansas were killed or wounded during the
series of skirmishes that constituted the campaign for Little Rock while dis-
ease incapacitated at least a thousand, results consistent with the Union anny's
experience in Arkansas as a whole during the war. Thousands of northern men
poured into a state that plagued with malaria and played only a small role in
the success of the Union war effort. Anopheles mosquitoes prostrated far more
soldiers stationed in Arkansas than were killed and wounded in battle.
Between July of 1863 and June of 1R65, over 72,000 Union troops assigned to
the state were diagnosed with malaria, making it the U.S. military's most
malarious department. IR
The prevalence of mosquito-borne disease in Arkansas may help explain
why Steele~s troops did almost nothing to impede the Confederate invasion of
Missouri that took place in the autumn of 1864. General Sterling "Old Pap"
Price desibrned the raid to draw bluecoats away from Petersburg and Atlanta and
encourage Missourians to vote the Democratic ticket in the November presi-
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dential election. At both the beginning an.d end of the unsuccessful campaign,
the lion's share of Price's forces crossed. the Arkansas River unmolested by
Steele's federals, a failurc which caused "great dissatisfactionl' in \Vashington
City. Steele thought the small sizc of his force and the vast size of the sur-
rounding territory made it impossible for him to bag "Old Pap." A report on the
department's troop strength issued at the end of October shows that only 17,
618 out of the 44,506 soldiers the general had on paper were actually available
to fight. Most of the others were ill, chiefly with malaria and diarrhea. 19
While Steele's troops were battling malarial infections in Arkansasl the
worst yellow fever epidemic to hit Texas during the Civil War sickened rebel
regiments stationed at Galveston. In January of 18h3, Confederate General
John Magruder had successfully driven off the Massachusetts regiment that
had been sent to occupy Galveston after the end of the sickly season. He for-
tified the city with more than three dozen cannon placed in various forts erect-
ed on Galveston and Pelican Islands, as well as at Virginia Point. Although the
U.S. naval blockade of the area continued, Galveston did not fall back into
Union hands until after Appomattox. By the summer of 1864, conditions
inside the city became deplorable. Confederate soldiers suffered from food
and supply shortages and were also owed ba<.:k pay. In August, rumors circu-
lated that yello\v fever was present in the city, prompting Magruder to quar-
antine ships aniving from areas known to have problems with the disease.
such as the West Indies and Mexico. The scene got even uglier when several
hundred fearful and frustrated soldiers mutinied and surrounded a house where
Magruder and his otlkcrs were being entertained by the ladies of Galveston.
The general was able to talk his way out of the situation, but was prohably
relieved when he was transferred to Arkansas later in the month, since by the
middle of September Galveston was in the throes of a full-blown yellow fever
epidemic. The disease "caused considerable excitement among the troops" and
"a number of them'l tried to desert their posts under cover of darkness on
September 16, the night before a lock-down of the island went into effect.
General James Morrison Hawes asked the residents of Houston to send nurs-
es to attend to the sick and dying, but they were unavailable due to an epi-
demic in their own city. The large sick list and shortage of acclimated guards
caused a breakdown of law and order in Galveston, with reports of robberies.
murders, and at least one attempted rape. The chaos afforded the Union fleet
patrolling the waters off Galveston an opportunity to seize the city, but even
the toughest salts were not about to expose their crews to the dreaded "'yellow
jack." Farragut issued orders to his commanders off Galveston to steer clear of
the city and avoid picking up passengers. 2U
By the time the first frost ended the Galveston epidemic in late Novembcr,
III soldiers and 158 civilians were dead. Nearly twenty percent of the casual-
ties in the anny occurred among German immigrants who had grown up in
areas where yellow fever was non-existent and as a rcsult~ had no immunity
when exposed, men such as twenty-fivc-year-oJd John Eickelberg who hved
in Austin County prior to the war and served as a musician in Elmore~s regi-
ment before a mosquito bite ended his life. Or Private Zitzleman who died as
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a member of Wilke's Battery and was buried in the potter's field in Galveston.
Confederate soldiers from Ireland, England, and France also perished during
the outbreak along with dozens of native Texans. The Houston epidemic con-
tinued well into December and killed an untold number of others. General
John Gcorge Walker, who had replaced Magruder in August as commander of
the District of Texas, Nc\\: Mexico, and Arizona and abandoned his Houston
headquarters when yellow fever appeared, believcd the outbreak had been a
"great drawback" to his defense strategy for Galveston. Walker, whose over-
all plan for Texas depcnded on occupying key locations and using interior
lines to transfer troops to threatened points, pulled soldiers from Sabine Pass
to prop up the weakened command at Galveston. Fortunately for the
Confederates. by the autumn of 1864, Union military planners were uninter-
estcd in committing large numbers of men to an area with little strategic value
that was periodically beset with dangerous plagues. The attack Walker pre-
pared for never materialized, but the shock of the 1864 Galveston epidemic
lingered aftcr the war was over. Union forces occupying the eity during the
summer of 1865 instituted a quarantine and strict sanitation measures in order
to prevent another epidemic. The next major outbreak in Galveston would
occur two years later and kiB ovcr 1100 people. 21
Each summer and fall. rebel and federal troops stationed in the
Confederate Trans-Mississippi theater were vulnerable to attack by both their
enemics and diseases they feared, but barely comprehended. Even the rumor
of a yellow fever epidemic was enough to send soldiers and their command-
ers scunying for the safety of healthier locations. But the risks posed by yel-
low fever paled in comparison to the widespread sickness caused by anophe-
les mosquitoes. Malaria was endemic in the region and weakened the immune
systems of soldiers who were already battling the various baetcrial infections
that were common during the Civil War. Fresh recruits from the North proved
especially susceptible to the disease and fell ill in droves during their first
"sickly season" in the South. The wartime experiencc of many of these young
men revolved around mosquitoes and violent fevers rather than battlefield
heroics. Anopheles and Aedes aegypti helped make sure that the campaigns
waged in the trans~Mississippi theater, most of which were inconsequential to
the larger conflict, were unusually sickly. Moreover, the diseases these insects
carried influenced the military decisions and strategic thinking of both Union
and Confederate commanders operating in the region.
NOTES
'Edward T. Colham, Jr., S'ahine Pag.~: The Crm(ederacy~' Th('rmopy!af' (Austin: University
of !'exas Press, 2004.1.1-27; Andrew Forest Muir, "Dick J)owling and tlle BailIe of Sabine Pass"
in Ralph A. Wooster, ed., Lone~'lar Blue and Gray: E.\·says on Texas ill the Civil War (Austin:
Texas State Hislorical Association. 19lJS), 190; Shelby Foote, The Cil'il U-ar: A lVarrutive, Vol. J
(New York: Vintage Dooks, 1986), 745.
'i'v'acchitnches Union, 18 September 1862; Muir, "DOWling," [90; The Bellville Countryman,
6 September 1862 (quotation); "Autobiography of Mrs. Otis McGaffey, Sr.," Yellowed Pages 2R
(Fall 1998): I-J4 (quolation); Cotham, Sabine, 29; Alwyn Barr, "Texas Coastal Defense, J861-
1~65" in Wooster, LOJze.sfar, 16\; The War uJfhe Rebellion: A Compilation a/the Otficial Recrmi.~
12 EAST TEXAS IIISTORICAL ASSOCIAflON
olthe (./nion mAd Confederate Annie.s, Vo!' 15, Series L p. 144-45, &13-15, hereafter referred (0
as OR.
'Lewis W. Pennington to Wilham H. Renshaw, September 29, 1862, Ofticial Records oflhe
Union and Col1/ederate ]v'avies ill che ~J-ar of the R£'bellion, Vol. 19, Series 1, 219-24. hereafter
referred to as OR/Ii'; Galveston Wt>ekly i\'ews, 15 October 1862 (quotation); X.B. Debray to PO.
Hebert. September 28. 1862, O.R. 15, Series 1, 815-17; Rodman L. Underviood, Wafers of
Discord. The Union Blockade of Texas During the Civil War (London: McFarland & Company,
2003),83,
"Margaret Humphreys, Yc//mv Fever and the South (Baltimore: The John~ Hopkins
University Press, 1992),4-5; S. Rickard Christuphers, Aedes Aegypti: The Yellow Fever Mo....qwto
(Cambridge: Cambri;e University Press, 1960), 57; Thomas M. Rivers, Viral and Rickettsial
InfeciioflS of.~fan. 2n Editioll (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1952).538-544; Andrew
Spielman and Michael D'Antonio. Mosquito: A Natural lJistory of Our MOSI Pergistent alld
Deadly Foe ('.jew York: Hyperion, 2001 ), 54-61.
The last yellow fever outbreak to occur north of Virginia happened in New York City ill
1~22. The reasons why the disease hecame a uniquely southern malady in the nineteenth century
remain unclear, although the North's longer ...... inters, quarantine and samtation practices, and trade
patterns may have played a role. John Dufty, "Yellow Fever In the Continental United States
During the Nineteenth Century," Bull('tin of the ,'.lew }ork Academy l!f"lI,{edicille 44 (June 1968):
6R7-701; K. David Patterson, "Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United Stales. 1693-
1905." Social Science and A1edicine 34 (1992): 855-865: Jo Ann Carrigan, "Yellow Fever:
Scourge of the South:' in Disease and Distinctiveness ill the American Sowh. ed. Todd L. Savitt
and James Harvey Young (Knoxville: The Universiry of Tennessee Press. 1988),55-78.
"Donald J. Krogstad, "Plasmodium Species (Malaria),' in Principles and Practice of
Infectious Diseases, 5th Edition. cd. Gerald L. Mandell, John E. Bennett, and Raphael Dolin
(Philadelphia: Churchill Livingstone, 2(00),2817-2829; Margaret Humphreys, J\;{alar"ia: Povt'rly,
Race, and Public Health in the United States (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Vniversitj' Press,
2001), 9: Darrett Ii. Rutman and Anita H. Rutman, "Of Agues and Fevers: Malaria in the F.arly
Chesapeake," William and Mary Quarterl.\.' 3] (January 1976): 31-60; Michael Colhoume,
Malaria in Aft'iea (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). 13-[6: Richard F. Darsie, Jr. and
Ronald A. Ward, Identification and Geographical Distribution of fhe Mosquitnes of North
America..Vorth of Mexicu (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). 2R6-297; N.R.H.
Hurgess and G.O. Cowan, Atlas o(Medical Entomology (London: Chapman and Hall Medical.
1993),11-14.
'Elisha Bartlett. The His/v!'.l: Diagnosis, and Treatment of the Fevers vf The l./nited .\-TateS
(Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea, 1852), 347-399: Edwin Samuel Gaillard, All EHay on
IlltermiUenl alld Bilious Remittent Fevers: With Their Pathological Relation to O:.one
(Charleston: Walker & Evans. Stationers and Printers, 1l.>\56), 17-1 R; Frs. Xavier DeRolettc.
LecJure on the Fevev & Ague and Other Intermittent Fevers (Pittshurgh: A.A. Andason & Sons.
18(5), 5: A.P. Merrill, Lee/ures on Few>/; Delivered in the Memphis Medical College. in N/5J-6
(New York: Harper & Brothers. 1865),98: John Duffy 'The Impacl of Malaria On the South," in
Savitt, Disease, 29-54.
'Daniel Drake, A !:J:vstemaric Treatise, Historical, Fliological. and Practical. orJ the Principal
DisC'ases of the Interior Valley ({f ,Vorth America. As Thel' Appear ill the Caucasian. "1friulIl,
Indian. and Esquimaux Varieties aIIH Population, ed. Norman D. Levine (Urbana: L"niversity of
Illinois Press, 1964), 703-ll; J.D. Rumph, '"Thoughts on Malaria. and the Causes Generally of
Fever," The Charleston Medical Journal and Re\'iew IX (July 1H54): 439-46: William \Vebb. "On
the So-called Malarious Diseases. A Paper Read Before the S1. Louis Medical Society," The St.
Louis Medical and Surgical Journal XI [ (December 1854): 481-85.
''The same process can be seen today in South America. [n Peru, for example. rainforest
destruction is causing an explosion in the number of malaria-carrying mosqllitoes. See Anne
Undcl"\\lood, "Tracking Disease," Newsweek CXLVI (Novemher 14. 2005): 46-48: Erwin H.
Ackerknecht Malaria in the {-'/Jper Mississippi Valley, I760-} 900 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1945), 1-15,
EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 13
'"Paul E. Steiner, Disea~·e in the Civil U-ar: Natural Biological Warfare in 1861-1865
(Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1968), 218-19; John Carrier, ··Medicine in Texas: the strug-
gle wilh yellow fever, 1839-1903:' Texas Medicine 82 (November 1986): 62-65; The Bellville
Countryman, IR& 25 October, 1 November 1862: Galveston !-reek!y Nt.'V>'s, 22 October 1&62.
'ID.G. Farragut to Gideon Welles, October 9, 1862 (quotation), H. French to D.G. Farragut,
September 18, 1862 (quotation), D.G. Farragut to H. french, October 7, Hl62 (quotation), ORN
19, Series L 265, 289-293.
'D.G. Farragut to W.H. Renshaw, September 19, 1862 (quotation), W.B. Renshaw to D.G.
Farragut, October 8, 1862 (quotation). OR/v' 19, Series 1,213,255-260; Charles C. Cumberland,
··The Confederate Loss and Recapture of Galveston, 1862-1863." The Suulhwe~·te,.n Historical
Quarterly U (October 1947): 109-119; Peggy H. Gregory, eomp., Record a/Interments ofthe City
of Galveston. 1859-1872 (Houston: f'rivate1y f'rinted, 1976), 28-29, in Rosenberg Library.
Galveston; David G. McComb, Galveston: A Ilistory (Austin: Univcrsity of Texas Press, 1986).
74-76.
"It is not clear how ctTcctivc "desiccated vegetables" may have been against scurvy. The
manufacturing and preparation methods used for these foodstuffs limited the amounl of Vitamin
C they conlained. The Medical and Sllrf{ical History o/the Civil War; Vol. 3 (Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1991).84-85 (quotations), hereafter referred to as M.SH.
"Charles W. Johnson, '"Narrative of the Sixth Regiment," in Minnesota in the Civil and
Indian Wars, 1861-1865. (St. Paul: Pioneer Press Company, 1891),300-328 (quotation); Charles
H. Lothrop, MD, A History a/the First Regiment [owa Cavaby Yeteran Volunteers (Lyons, LA:
Beers & Eaton. l890), 130; Illinois at Vicksburg (Published Cnder the Authority of an Aet of the
Forty-fifth General Assembly by the Illinois-Vicksburg Military Park Commission, 1(07), Library
of Congress, 141-312; E.H. Quiner, The Militl1l:Y History of Wisconsin (Chicago: Clarke & Co.,
Publishers, 1866), 760-66; C.C. Andrews, ··Narrative of [he Third Regiment", in Minnesota, 165-
67; Frederick Steele to John Schofield, September 12, 1863, O.R. 22, Serics I, Pt 1,474-77 (quo-
tation.).
"John ScOtt, Story of the Thirty Second Iowa Infi1ntry Volunleers. (Nevada, IA: John Scott,
1896),59: Foote, Civil War, Vol. 11,702; A.F. Sperl)', History a/the 33d IOll-'a Infant1}' Volunteer
Regiment. 1863-6 (Des Moines: Mills & Company, 1866),37-41 (quolation.).
"Frederick Steele to Stephen A. Hurlbut, August 23, 1863, Steele to John Schofield,
September 1, 1863, o.R. 22, Series 1, Pt. 1,472-474.
"Joseph R. Smit]) to J.K. Barnes. January 20. 1866, Sanital}' Repon ofthe Anny ofArkansas
fnr the last quarter of 1863, U.S. Surgeon General's Office, History of Medicine Division,
National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Maryland (quotation); M.SH., Vol. 2, 343-46 (quota-
lion.).
·Scott.lowa, 59-61; Sperry. 33d IOIvu, 42-43 (quotation); Frederick Steele to H.W. Halleck,
September 12, 1863, O.R. 22, Series L Pt. 1, 474-82 (quotation); Steiner, Di.~ease, 21 R-19.
'H.W. Halleck to F.R.S. Canby, November 12, 1864, OR. 41, Series L Pt. 4,529 (quota-
tion); F. Steele to J.M. Thayer. November 12, ]1<64, o.R. 41, Series L Pt. 4, 535; "Report of troops
serving in the Department of Arkansas", October 31, ]SM, o.R. 4l, Series I, Pt. 4, 341: Steiner,
Disease, 219.
"'Cumberland, "Loss," Il8; Barr, "Texas," 14-15; McComb, Galveston, 79; H.C. Medord,
'The Diary of H.C. Medford, Confederate Soldier. 1864," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 34
(1930): 106-140; Allstin State Gazette, 21 September (quotation) & 12 October 1864; Charles W.
] (ayes, JJistory of the l\'land and tile City of Galveswn, Vol. (I (Austin: Jenkins Garrett Press,
1974), 623-625; OR. 41, Series 1, Pt. 2, 1020: D.G. Farragut to \V.E. Le Roy, September 2], 1HM,
ORN21, Series 1,655.
~IAuslin Slate Gazette, 7, 14 & 24 December 1864; Galveston Interment Records, 43-49; J.G.
Walker to W.R. Boggs, October 26, 1864, o.R. 41, Series L rt. 4, 1014-15 (quotation); Hayes,
Galveston, 649-51; Patterson, ··Yellow Fever," R5R.
